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Responses to Technological Change 
The Story of Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty: Technological 
Change and the Subject 
Matter Boundaries of the 
Patent System 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg* 
Technological change often exposes unstated assumptions lurking in 
the law and makes them problematic, and patent law is no exception. 
Although the core mission of the patent system is to promote technologi-
cal progress, path-breaking new technologies have not always been easily 
assimilated within its boundaries. The first wave of patent applications 
on advances in biotechnology in the 1970s illustrate some of the difficul-
ties. Before that time, living organisms had generally been assumed to 
fall outside the range of patent-eligible subject matter under a time-
honored exclusion for "products of nature."1 But genetically engineered 
organisms, although derived from naturally occurring life forms, seemed 
to involve too much human intervention to be characterized as natural 
products. Were they eligible for patent protection? Should the default 
rule be protection or no protection? What are the roles of the courts, the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the legislature in figuring it 
out? 
The first stop for inventors seeking patent rights in new technolo-
gies, and thus the first institution to confront the legal issues that these 
technologies raise, is the PTO. In the 1970s, as Ananda Chakrabarty's 
patent application on a genetically modified, oil-eating bacterium worked 
its way through the system, the PTO was confronting growing numbers 
of patent applications in emerging "high technology" fields, notably 
* Cc) 2005 Rebecca 8. Eisenberg. I am grateful to Rochelle Dreyfuss, Jane Ginsburg, and 
Daniel Kevles for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
1 See Funk Bros. Seed v. Kala Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
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information technology and biotechnology, that strained the capacities of 
its existing corps of examiners. Examination of patent applications in 
new fields always presents special administrative challenges, including a 
lack of examiners with the appropriate technical training and a lack of 
readily accessible prior art in the form of previously issued patents.2 
These challenges were particularly daunting in the days before examin-
ers had access to commercial databases of prior art or even to personal 
computers. In this environment, the PTO had a strong institutional 
incentive to exclude these fields categorically from patent eligibility 
pending explicit legislation providing for their protection. Categorical 
exclusions offer an efficient mechanism for filtering out patent applica-
tions at the threshold of the PTO, without the need for examiners to 
delve into the underlying technology and to compare the claimed inven-
tions to the prior art. If Congress thought that patent protection was 
appropriate, it could address the resource needs of the PTO at the same 
time that it considered what additional legislation was necessary for 
these fields. 
On its face, the Patent Act extends protection to "any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter," with-
out explicit subject matter exclusions.3 But over the years the courts and 
the PTO have sometimes seemed to endorse exclusions from patent 
eligibility for certain categories of inventions, including architectural 
designs/ medical and surgical techniques,5 plants/ agricultural methods,7 
2 See generally Bhaven N. Sampat, Examining Patent Examination: An Analysis of 
Examiner and Applicant Generated Prior Art, NBER Working Papers (Aug. 2004 draft) 
(concluding on basis of empirical examination of prior art references cited by examiners 
and applicants that examiners are far better at identifying prior art in U.S. patents than 
they are at searching non-patent prior art or foreign patents, and that examiners face 
particular challenges in identifying prior art in emerging technological fields). 
:i 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
1 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Baker, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 295 (1869) (suggesting that improvements 
in the construction of jails were not patent-eligible subject matter, although also noting 
that patents were properly invalidated for lack of novelty). 
3 Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865) 
(holding ineligible for patent protection method of performing surgery by applying ether to 
render patient insensitive to pain); Ex parte Brinkerhoff, 24 Dec. Comm'n Pat. 349 (1883) 
(holding that "the methods or modes of treatment of physicians of certain diseases are not 
patentable."). But cf Smith & Nephew v. Ethicon, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNAl 1888, 1889 (D. 
Ore. 1999) (claiming "a method of attaching tissue to bone by using a resilient suture 
anchor which is pressed into a hole in the bone"); Catapano v. Wyeth Ayerst Pharmaceuti-
cals, 88 F.Supp.2d 27, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (claiming a method of treating a human patient 
to effect the remission of AIDS). 
6 Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Comm'n Dec. 13 (1889) (holding ineligible for patent 
protection a claim to "cellular tissues of the Pinus australis" tree separated from "the 
silicious, resinous, and pulpy parts of the pine needles and subdivided into Jong, pliant 
filaments adapted to be spun and woven"). But cf'. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International, 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (holding plants eligible for patent protection). 
7 Wall v. Leck, 66 F. 552 (9 th Cir. 1895) (invalidating patent on a process of fumigating 
citrus trees in the absence of light). 
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business methods,8 mathematical algorithms,9 and products and phenom-
ena of nature. rn These exclusions have been viewed skeptically by the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) and by its 
predece_ssor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA),11 and by 
now most have been repudiated.12 But thirty years ago the exclusions 
appeared far more robust. They retained vitality, despite skepticism from 
the CCPA, because they could claim authority from decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. t:l This divergence of views between the CCPA on one 
hand, and the PTO and Supreme Court on the other, set the stage for 
repeated rejections, appeals, reversals, and further appeals, generating a 
confusing and inconsistent body of caselaw.14 
8 Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding 
invalid a patent on a "method for cash-registering and account-checking designed to 
prevent frauds by waiters" while noting that "a system of transacting business disconnect-
ed from the means for carrying out the system is not ... an art."). But cf State St. Bank & 
Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting business 
method exception and stating that basis for Hotel Security decision was lack of novelty 
rather than lack of patent-eligible subject matter). 
!I Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
111 Funk Bros. Seed v. Kala lnoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
11 Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, consolidating 
intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent law matters in a single court that would 
hear appeals from decisions of the PTO and decisions of the Federal District Courts in 
patent cases. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. An 
important goal was to bring about greater uniformity and consistency in interpretations of 
the patent laws. 
12 E.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); AT & T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 
F.3d 1352 (Fed.Cir.1999); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'! v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'!, 534 U.S. 124, 130 
(2001). 
i:i See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed v. Kala Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
14 See, e.g., In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (reversing PTO rejection of 
claims to a computer-implemented method of converting numbers expressed in binary 
coded decimal to pure binary form), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 
(1972); In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (reversing PTO rejection of claims to 
a "machine system for automatic record-keeping of bank checks and deposits"), reu'd sub 
nom., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977) 
(reversing PTO rejection of claims to a method of updating alarm limits in a catalytic 
conversion process through use of a novel mathematical formula), rev'd sub nom. Parker v. 
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Supreme Court review has long been something of a wild card in 
patent law adjudication. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has ultimate 
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases in the federal courts, patent law 
consumes relatively little of the Supreme Court's attention, whereas it is 
a central concern of the PTO and its reviewing court (the Federal Circuit 
today and the CCPA at the time of the Chakrabarty decision). Aggrieved 
litigants, including the PTO, have often sought Supreme Court review of 
Federal Circuit (and CCPA) decisions, and occasionally have persuaded 
the Court to reverse. But the Supreme Court's sporadic interventions in 
the field have sometimes seemed like rules laid down by a noncustodial 
parent during weekend visits with the kids-at best, sparingly enforced 
once everyday life resumes under the supervision of someone whose 
judgment differs. 
A leading voice on the intermediate appellate court for limiting 
categorical exclusions and for making patent protection available to 
inventions in all fields was that of Judge Giles Rich, who served first on 
the CCPA and then on the Federal Circuit for a total of 43 years. 15 As he 
sometimes noted in his opinions and other writings, Iii Judge Rich played 
a major role in drafting the Patent Act of 1952 prior to his appointment 
to the bench in 1956. Judge Rich believed that the 1952 Act had 
overturned restrictions on the availability of patent protection set forth 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A.1977) (reversing PTO 
rejection of claims to a biologically pure culture of a microorganism), uacated and 
remanded for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 
438 U.S. 902 (1978), on remand, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (again reversing rejection of 
claims), uacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as moot sub 110m. Diamond u. 
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980); In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978) 
(reversing decision of PTO to reject claims to a bacterium that had been genetically 
engineered to degrade multiple components of crude oil), cert. dismissed sub nom. Banner 
v. Chakrabarty, 439 U.S. 801 (1978), on rehearing, In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 
1979) (again reversing rejection of claims), aff'd, 44 7 U.S. 303 (1980); In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 
982 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (reversing PTO rejection of claims to method of curing synthetic 
rubber which includes use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer), 
aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
15 See Paul R. Michel, Recollections of Judge Giles S. Rich, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 3 
(1999), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol14/Michel/html/ 
reader.html. 
16 E.g., Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J. concurring) 
("I write in order to express some additional thoughts respecting 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) as a 
member of the group which drafted that section .... In my view, considering what I know 
to have been the intent of[§ 102(g) of the Patent ActJ, it has been thoroughly misapplied 
by the board and the dissent here ... "). See generally Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent-
Or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, in SouTHWESTERN LEGAL FouNDATION, PATENT 
PROCUREMENT AND EXPLOITATION PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 61, 78 (1963) (quoting a 
member of Congress who said that Rich and the other drafters of the statute, "far more 
than any member of the House or Senate, knew and understood what was intended by the 
language used."). 
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in prior Supreme Court decisions, making the analysis and even the 
vocabulary of the older cases obsolete and irrelevant.17 
A leading voice on the Supreme Court for restricting patent eligibili-
ty, both before and after passage of the 1952 Act, was that of Justice 
William 0. Douglas, who, before his retirement in 1975, served almost as 
long on the Supreme Court as Judge Rich served on the intermediate 
appellate courts.18 To Justice Douglas, the patent system was a limited 
exception to an overall preference, on the part of both Congress19 and the 
framers of the Constitution,20 for free competition in the U.S. economy. 
He believed that patent rights had to be administered parsimoniously to 
avoid extending monopolies beyond what Congress intended and the 
Constitution permits.21 Justice Douglas therefore set high standards for 
getting a patent and endorsed broad exclusions from patent protection 
for fundamental building blocks of science and technology such as 
phenomena of nature22 and mathematical formulae. 23 Although Justice 
Douglas was no longer on the Court when it decided Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, his prior decisions in patent cases remained influential. 
Against the backdrop of these competing judicial currents, science 
and technology moved forward, bringing new technologies before the 
PTO. 
17 E.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (noting that pre-1952 cases used 
the terms "inventions," "inventive," and "invent" to convey meanings which the terms no 
longer have in the revised statute). A notable example of a vocabulary change brought 
about by the Patent Act of 1952 is the reframing of the Supreme Court's requirement, 
drawn from the language of the U.S. Constitution, that a patent could only be issued for an 
"invention," into the statutory requirement, set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 103, that in order to 
be patentable a claimed invention must be "nonobvious." Cf Graham v. John Deere, 383 
U.S. 1 ( 1966) (noting that the limitation of patent protection to "inventions" is required by 
the Constitution, that the Court interprets the statutory standard of "nonobviousness" to 
be consistent with the Constitutional limitation, and that if Congress were in fact to 
diminish the standard for protection below that required by the Constitution, the Court 
would be compelled to hold the statute invalid). 
18 Justice Douglas was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1939 and retired in 1975, for 
a total term of 36 1/2 years. Oyez U.S. Supreme Court Multimedia, William 0. Douglas, 
http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legaLentity/79/ (last visited Jul. 25, 2005). 
19 Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470,495 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Congress 
in the patent laws decided that where no patent existed, free competition should pre-
vail. ... "). 
2o A & P Tea v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
("The Congress does not have free rein ... to decide that patents should be easily or freely 
given .... The Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted."). 
21 Id. 
22 Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
2:i Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
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Chakrabarty's Invention 
Ananda Chakrabarty is a Distinguished Professor of Microbiology 
and Immunology at the University of Illinois who has accumulated a 
long list of scientific publications over a career spanning four decades.24 
But in legal circles, he is better known as the patent applicant who 
litigated the issue of the patentability of living organisms in the land-
mark Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.25 
After completing his Ph.D. at the University of Calcutta in 1965, 
Chakrabarty went to the University of Illinois at Urbana as a postdocto-
ral associate, where he studied the ability of Pseudomonas bacteria to 
utilize a wide variety of organic compounds as nutrition. In the course of 
this work, he discovered that the genes that allowed the bacteria to 
digest compounds such as camphor and octane did not reside on the 
bacterial chromosome, but rather on separate DNA elements called 
plasmids that are more readily transmissible from one bacterium to 
another. Chakrabarty's research demonstrated the potential of Pseudo-
monas bacteria to transfer between organisms plasmids containing the 
genes that permit assimilation of these compounds, thereby enhancing 
their nutritional versatility.26 
In 1971 Chakrabarty left the University of Illinois for a position in 
the Research and Development Center of General Electric, where he was 
assigned to work on the nutritionally frugal (if unappetizing) problem of 
converting cow manure into cattle feed. 27 But he retained an interest in 
basic research, and soon found a persuasive commercial justification for 
continuing his prior research on Pseudomonas. In the early 1970s, in 
some parts of the world, oil was cheap, but protein sources were 
24 A list of Chakrabarty's scientific publications is posted at http://www.uic.edu/depts/ 
mcmi/faculty/chakrabarty.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004). 
25 44 7 U.S. 303 (1980). This decision was the focus of extensive law review commen-
tary. See, e.g., Peter B. Maggs, New Life for Patents: Chakrabarty and Rohm & Haas Co., 
1980 SuP. CT. REV. 57 (1980); Note, The Patentability of Living Matter: Hey Waiter, What's 
Chakrabarty's Pseudomonas Bacterium Doing Back in the Supreme Court's Soup?, 37 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 183 (1980); Note, Live, Human-made Bacteria As Patentable Subject 
Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 1980 BYU L. REv 705 (1980); 
Note, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Living Things as Statutory Subject Matter, l N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 119 (1980); Note, Patentability of Living Microorganisms: Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 94 
HARV L. REv.261 (1980); Note, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Oil Eaters: Alive and Patentable, 8 
PEPP L. REV. 747 (1981); Note, Building a Better Bacterium: Genetic Engineering and the 
Patent Law After Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 81 CowM. L. REV. 159 (1981). 
26 Ananda M. Chakrabarty, Patenting of Life-Forms From a Concept to Reality, in D. 
MAGNUS ET AL, WHo OWNS LIFE' (2002). The definitive historical account of the Chakrabarty 
case is Daniel J. Kevles, Ananda Chakrabarty wins a patent: Biotechnology, law, and 
society, 1972-1980, 25 HIST STUD. IN THE PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 111 (1994). 
27 Kevles, supra note 26, at 114. 
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expensive. These relative values made it commercially attractive to 
develop a process for converting crude oil to bacterial biomass (which 
would ultimately provide nutrition higher up in the food chain).28 It 
occurred to Chakrabarty that Pseudomonas bacteria could be put to use 
in this bioconversion task, since he knew they could derive nutrition 
from various components of crude oil. But crude oil is a mixture of many 
different hydrocarbons, of which known Pseudomonas strains could only 
degrade a limited number. A mixed culture of strains could potentially 
digest more components, but some strains inevitably dominated others 
in mixed cultures, limiting the extent of degradation (and therefore 
limiting the generation of biomass). Knowing from his prior work that 
the genes for degrading the separate components were borne on plasmids 
that could be transferred from one bacterium to another, Chakrabarty 
hit upon the idea of constructing a single Pseudomonas strain with 
multiple plasmids. He worked on the problem after-hours and on week-
ends, and eventually succeeded.29 While his research proceeded, the price 
of crude oil rose substantially in world markets, calling into question the 
value of the strain as a means of converting petroleum to biomass. But 
his colleagues at GE decided that an oil-eating bacterium might nonethe-
less be useful for another purpose-cleaning up oil spills-and on June 7, 
1972, GE filed a patent application on Charkrabarty's invention.3<1 
The PTO's Response 
Patents on technologies involving the use of microorganisms were by 
this point familiar subject matter for the patent system. The pharmaceu-
tical industry had been securing patents on methods of producing 
antibiotics from microbial strains for decades,31 and patents on microbial 
processes for waste treatment were older still.32 What made Chakrabar-
ty's application unusual was that he claimed not only methods of using 
his bacterial strains, but also the bacteria themselves. 
The patent examiner allowed Chakrabarty's process claims, but 
rejected the product claims to the bacteria on two grounds: (1) that the 
claimed microorganisms are "products of nature"; and (2) that as "live 
organisms" they are not eligible for patent protection.3:1 Chakrabarty 
28 Chakrabarty, supra note 26, at 18. 
29 Id. at 19. 
:10 Id. at 19-20. 
31 E.g., In re Maney, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (upholding patent claims to process 
of making antibiotic by cultivating strain of bacteria). 
:iz E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) (patent on 
method of treating raw sewage). 
:1:1 In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
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appealed the rejection to the PTO Board of Appeals (the Board). The 
Board set aside the examiner's holding that the bacteria were products 
of nature, agreeing with Chakrabarty that his multi-plasmid Pseudomo-
nas bacteria were not naturally occurring, but nonetheless affirmed the 
rejection on the ground that living organisms may not be patented.34 
Meanwhile, in Ex parte Bergy,35 a different Board panel applied a 
similar analysis to an appeal from a rejection of a claim to a ''biologically 
pure culture" of an antibiotic-producing microorganism. Bergy's organ-
ism had not been genetically altered, and thus might have been more 
readily characterized as a "product of nature" than Chakrabarty's multi-
plasmid bacterium. (Indeed, the sole basis for the examiner's rejection of 
Bergy's claim was that it constituted an unpatentable product of na-
ture.)36 But the Board declined to consider whether the biologically pure 
culture was a product of nature, and instead affirmed the rejection on 
the different ground that it was living, and thus was not a patentable 
"manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of§ 101 
of the Patent Act.37 
In both cases, the Board thus set aside the "products of nature" 
ground for rejections and focused instead on the fact that the claims 
were drawn to living subject matter. In retrospect, this choice seems 
both puzzling and fateful. Although patent applications on living organ-
isms had been rejected in the past,38 there was no precedent explicitly 
stating that living things are ipso facto ineligible for patent protection. 
Instead, the stated ground for exclusion had been that they were 
unpatentable products of nature. Under the circumstances, one might 
expect that the PTO would retain on appeal the tried-and true ground 
for rejection rather than resting solely on an argument that the courts 
had never considered. 
To be sure, the products of nature argument was problematic in the 
facts of both Chakrabarty and Bergy. A series of cases had previously 
upheld patents on purified versions of products that exist in nature only 
in an impure state, reasoning that the purified products were the result 
of human intervention, and that in a purified state they were suitable for 
purposes that the impure versions could not serve.39 Similar arguments 
34 571 F.2d at 42. 
:i5 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78 (U.S. P.T.O. Bd. App. & lnterf., 1976), rev'd sub nom. In re 
Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
36 In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1032-33. 
37 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 79-80; 563 F.2d at 1033. 
38 E.g., Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Comm'n Dec. 13 (1889). 
39 E.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (purified 
adrenaline); Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken, 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 220 
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could be made for the organisms claimed by both Chakrabarty and 
Bergy. But none of the "purified substances" cases had been affirmed by 
the Supreme Court. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court had seemed to endorse a more expansive 
exclusion in its 1948 decision in Funk Brothers Seed Company v. Kala 
Inoculant,40 a case with notable similarities to Chakrabarty. The patent 
at issue in that case claimed a mixed culture of naturally occurring 
strains of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, useful as an inoculant to 
permit plants to fix nitrogen from the environment. In the past, different 
species of Rhizobium had been used to inoculate the roots of different 
plants, but when multiple strains were combined, they had inhibited 
each other's effectiveness. The inventor, Bond, identified strains that did 
not have this mutually inhibitive effect and combined them in a single 
product that could be used to inoculate multiple crops. The PTO issued 
the patent and, in a subsequent infringement action, the Court of 
Appeals upheld the validity of Bond's claim to the mixed culture, 
characterizing it as a new composition of matter that contributed utility 
and economy to the manufacture and distribution of commercial inocu-
lants. The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Douglas, 
the Court elaborated upon the exclusion of the work of nature from 
patent protection: 
Bond does not create a state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the 
bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature. Those qualities are 
of course not patentable. For patents cannot issue for the discovery 
of the phenomena of nature. The qualities of these bacteria, like the 
heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws 
of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who 
discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to 
a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention 
from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law 
of nature to a new and useful end. 41 
Justice Douglas conceded that Bond had indeed applied his discovery of 
the noninhibitive qualities of the bacterial strains to a new and useful 
end by combining them into a new product-the mixed culture of his 
claim. 12 He nonetheless concluded that the product was not patentable, 
in language that sometimes suggested a categorical exclusion and some-
U.S. 622 (1911) (purified prostaglandins); Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Corp., 253 F.2d 
156 (4th Cir. 1958) (purified vitamin Bl2). 
40 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
41 Id. at 130. 
-12 Id. at 131-32. 
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times suggested a failure to meet the patent law standard for "inven-
tion": 
But we think that that aggregation of species fell short of invention 
within the meaning of the patent statutes. Discovery of the fact that 
certain strains of each species of these bacteria can be mixed 
without harmful effect to the properties of either is a discovery of 
their qualities of non-inhibition. It is no more than the discovery of 
some of the handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable .... 
[H]owever ingenious the discovery of the natural principle may have 
been, the application of it is hardly more than an advance in the 
packaging of the inoculants. . . . The combination of species pro-
duces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and 
no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each species has the 
same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural 
way. Their use in combination does not improve in any way their 
natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided 
and act quite independently of any effort of the patenteeY 
One could, by analogy, have argued that Chakrabarty had also discover-
ed some of the handiwork of nature-naturally occurring plasmids that 
could be transferred from one microbial host to another, each permitting 
its host to degrade a different component of crude oil-and combined 
them in a single host organism. As Chakrabarty himself explained in a 
1980 interview with People, "I simply shuffled genes, changing bacteria 
that already existed."44 In Chakrabarty's combination, as in Bond's, each 
of the subunits (Chakrabarty's plasmids, Bond's species) continued to 
perform in its natural way. If Chakrabarty's aggregation of multiple 
selected plasmids in a single organism required more ingenuity than 
Bond's aggregation of selected species in a mixed culture inoculant, this 
distinction would seem to be a matter of nonobviousness, or "invention" 
in the vernacular of pre-1952 Act decisions, rather than a matter of 
patent eligibility. 
The distinction between the threshold question of patent eligibility 
and the more fine-grained question of patent-worthiness was easy to 
miss in the pre-1952 cases, when the single term "invention" might be 
used to describe what was lacking in both situations. 40 The 1952 Act 
43 Id. at 131. 
44 PEOPLE, July 14, 1980, at 38 (as cited in Kevles, supra note 26, at 116). 
45 Compare Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, at 
96 n.4 (1939) ("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not 
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of 
scientific truth may be." (emphasis added)) with Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 149 (1950) ("Courts should scrutinize 
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codified the requirement of "invention" in the latter sense and gave it a 
new name, "nonobviousness,"46 but Funk v. Kala was decided before 
that time and explained in language that left a lingering ambiguity about 
whether Bond's invention was categorically ineligible for patent protec-
tion or was merely unworthy of patent protection because it was trivial. 
This ambiguity may have made Funk v. Kala questionable as authority 
for rejecting the claims of Chakrabarty and Bergy. 
But Funk v. Kalo was not the last word from the Supreme Court on 
this subject. Even after passage of the 1952 Act, in the years leading up 
to its decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty the Supreme Court had relied 
on Funk v. Kala in two more cases, each involving rejections of claims to 
computer-implemented inventions.47 Although the precedential value of a 
case about a mixed culture of bacteria for resolving cases about comput-
er-implemented inventions might not be not self-evident, Justice Doug-
las, writing for the Court, not only cited Funk v. Kala with approval but 
seemed to rely upon it: 
Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work. As we stated in Funk 
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kala Co., "He who discovers a hitherto unknown 
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the 
law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it 
must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and 
useful end." We dealt there with a "product" claim, while the 
present case deals with a "process" claim. But we think the same 
principle applies. 48 
Categorical exclusions from patent eligibility for "products of nature" 
thus retained considerable vitality in the Supreme Court in the 1970s, 
making it all the more puzzling that the PTO would set aside this 
ground for rejecting the Charkrabarty and Bergy claims while resting 
combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of 
finding invention in an assembly of old elements." (emphasis added)). 
46 35 U.S.C. § 103; Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
47 In the first of these cases, Gottschalk u. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), a unanimous 
Court overturned the CCPA and reinstated the PTO's rejection of a claim to a method of 
converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals. The Court again 
invoked the "products of nature" cases in its 6-3 decision in Parker v. Flook to overturn 
the C.C.P.A. and reinstate the PTO's rejection of a claim to a computer-implemented 
method for updating an alarm limit in the startup of a catalytic conversion plant. 437 U.S. 
584 (1978). This 1978 decision had not yet come down when the PTO Board decided the 
Chakrabarty and Bergy cases. See infra notes 72 to 79 and accompanying text. For a fuller 
discussion of of Gottschalk v. Benson and and Parker v. Flook, see Maureen A. O'Rourke, 
The Story of Diamond v. Diehr: Toward Patenting Software, elsewhere in this Volume. 
48 409 U.S. at 67-68 (citation omitted). 
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solely on an unprecedented categorical exclusion for living things. It is 
generally easier to persuade courts to adjust the boundaries of existing 
legal categories to accommodate new facts than it is to persuade them to 
create new categories. 
Lacking explicit precedent for the principle that living things may 
not be patented, the PTO was left to make a complex, and ultimately 
unpersuasive, argument for an inference about Congressional intent (or 
assumptions) concerning the patentability of living things from the fact 
that Congress had passed special legislation to provide intellectual prop-
erty protection for plants. The argument went as follows: Congress twice 
acted to provide intellectual property rights in plants: first, in the Plant 
Patent Act of 1930, which conferred patent rights in asexually repro-
duced plants;49 and second, in the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 
which conferred more limited protection under the auspices of the 
Department of Agriculture for sexually reproduced varieties.50 Since 
Congress went to the trouble of passing special legislation to provide 
protection for plants, Congress must have believed that, absent such 
legislation, plants would not be eligible for ordinary utility patent 
protection under the general patent statute. Congress must therefore 
have believed that plants did not fit within the existing patentable 
subject matter categories of "manufacture" or "composition of matter." 
The reason Congress thought that plants were excluded from those 
statutory categories must have been that plants are living, and therefore 
Congress must have believed that the statutory categories of patentable 
subject matter excluded not only plants, but also all other living things. 
From legislation that made it easier to get protection for plants, the PTO 
thus drew an inference that Congress intended as a general rule to 
exclude all living things from patent eligibility. 
To recite this syllogism is to draw a roadmap for its rebuttal. The 
relevant statutory language was, at the time, almost 200 years old, and 
the actions of later Congresses is a questionable source for understand-
ing the meaning of language used by an earlier Congress. Quite apart 
from this difficulty, it is easy to come up with competing explanations 
that are equally compelling. Perhaps, rather than believing that plants 
were categorically excluded from the patent system on subject matter 
grounds, Congress believed that plants could not satisfy the usual 
standards for getting a patent (such as "invention"/nonobviousness and 
written description) and wished to provide a source of protection that 
avoided these obstacles. (Indeed, both the Plant Patent Act and the 
Plant Variety Protection Act provided relief from some of the more 
49 46 Stat. 376, codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161 et seq. 
50 84 Stat. 1547, codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2402 et seq. 
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stringent requirements of patent law for plants.)51 Perhaps Congress 
believed that plants were ineligible for patent protection not because 
they were living, but because they were products of nature. Perhaps 
Congress focused narrowly on the problems of plant breeders because 
that was the issue before them, and gave no thought to the patenting of 
other living things. 
However narrowly Congress may have focused its attention in 1930 
and in 1970, it is hardly possible that the PTO and the courts were 
oblivious to public controversy over biotechnology as they contemplated 
the issues before them in Chakrabarty and Bergy. The invention in the 
early 1970s of recombinant DNA techniques, which permitted scientists 
to create new organisms by splicing together genes from different 
species, had provoked profound anxiety among scientists as well as the 
general public.;;2 While most scientists soon concluded that initial worries 
about the hazards of gene-splicing had been overstated, 53 popular inter-
est and anxiety continued, taking on a new dimension with the advent of 
commercial biotechnology in the latter half of the1970s. 51 Although 
neither Chakrabarty nor Bergy had used recombinant DNA technology 
in making their inventions, it was surely apparent to those considering 
their cases that their decisions would have important implications for 
future inventions in this controversial new field. 55 
;;i See 35 U.S.C. § 162 ("No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance 
with section 112 of this title [regarding description and disclosure] if the description is as 
complete as is reasonably possible."). The Plant Variety Protection Act has no counterpart 
to the nonobviousness requirement and has disclosure requirements that are easier to meet 
than those for an ordinary utility patent. For a comparison of the two schemes, see Mark 
D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury ... ?, 39 Rous. L. 
REV. 727, 745-78 (2002). 
52 Concerns within the scientific community led to a historic conference of molecular 
biologists at the Asilomar conference center in Pacific Grove, California to discuss the 
hazards associated with recombinant DNA research in early 1975. Much has been written 
about these events. A useful synthesis may be found in Judith P. Swazey, James R. 
Sorenson, & Cynthia B. Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A History of 
the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 So. CAL L. REV 1019-78 (1978). For an 
interesting retrospective on the controversy within the scientific community from the 
perspective of the NIH Director at the time, see Donald S. Fredrickson, Asilomar and 
Recombinant DNA: The End of the Beginning, in Institute of Medicine, BIOMEDICAL Pouncs 
(1991 ). For a more critical perspective, see SHELDON KRrMsKY. GENETIC ALCHEMY THE SocIAL 
HISTORY OF THE RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY (1982). 
;;:; Kevles, supra note 26, at 121. 
31 See MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY. THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 90-106, 132-75 
(1986); DAVID DICKSON. THE NEW POLITICS OF SCIENCE 56-106 (1984). 
55 Cf Kevles, supra note 26, at 121 (suggesting that "considerations of political 
economy of biotechnology" did not figure in the PTO's analysis until after its decision had 
been reversed by the C.C.P.A., when it had to decide whether to appeal to the Supreme 
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Perhaps awareness of contemporary social discourse best accounts 
for the PTO's focus on "living things" rather than "products of nature" 
as the basis for rejecting the claims. In the rhetoric of the "products of 
nature" cases, it was nature that had done the heavy lifting, creating 
products and phenomena with awesome capabilities. The value-added of 
human inventors was relatively trivial, consisting primarily of figuring 
out what nature had done and then making minor adaptations without 
really changing much. In the anxious rhetoric surrounding genetic 
engineering in the 1970s, the relationship between nature and human 
inventors was pictured quite differently. Human interventions in this 
setting did not seem trivial, but profound and unsettling. Rather than 
merely copying from nature, humans seemed to be altering nature's 
plans in unprecedented (and, to some, alarming) ways. Neither propo-
nents nor adversaries of the new technology saw it as the work of 
nature. The concerns and intuitions that had persuaded previous courts 
to leave natural products and natural phenomena as part of an unpat-
ented "storehouse of knowledge ... free to all men and reserved exclu-
sively to none" may thus have seemed inapposite in that particular 
historical moment. 56 
Even if the products of nature doctrine could serve to exclude the 
relatively "low-tech" inventions of Chakrabarty and Bergy, it was un-
likely to stretch far enough to exclude the results of "high-tech" genetic 
engineering from the patent system. The essence of public anxiety about 
genetic engineering was not that it was natural, but rather that it was 
unnatural, that it amounted to audacious human tampering with life. An 
argument for excluding living things from patent protection, although 
lacking explicit support in precedent, may have resonated more closely 
with this sentiment than the time-honored argument for excluding 
products of nature. 
The CCPA Reverses 
Chakrabarty and Bergy each appealed the rejections of their claims 
to the CCPA, which reversed in each case by a vote of 3-2.57 Both 
Court). But even prior to that time, as the PTO was deciding the Chakrabarty and Bergy 
appeals in the first instance, PTO personnel were surely aware of extensive coverage of 
controversy over recombinant DNA research in both the scientific press, e.g., Davis, Genetic 
Engineering: How Great Is the Danger?, 186 SCIENCE 309 (1974); Erwin Chargaff, A Slap at 
the Bishops of Asilomar, 190 SCIENCE 135 (1975), and the popular press, e.g., Horace F. 
Judson, Fearful of Science: after Copernicus, after Darwin, after Freud comes molecular 
biology. Is nothing sacred?, 250 HARPER'S 1498 (1975); Bennett & Guerin, Science That 
Frightens Scientists, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1977, at 49. 
56 Concerns about patents on natural phenomena impeding future scientific work 
resurfaced much later in controversies over the patenting of DNA sequences as the Human 
Genome Project got under way in the 1990s. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Why the Gene 
Patenting Controversy Persists, 77 ACADEMIC MEDICINE 1381 (2002). 
57 Jn re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 
1978). 
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majority opinions were authored by Judge Rich, who took care to isolate 
the issue for decision as narrowly as possible. He began each opinion by 
stating that the PTO had not questioned that the inventions satisfied 
the statutory criteria for patentability apart from the issue of statutory 
subject matter.58 He then reviewed the proceedings in the PTO, noting in 
each case that, although the examiners had rejected the claimed inven-
tions as "products of nature," the Board had affirmed instead on the 
different ground that statutory subject matter does not extend to "living 
subject matter."59 Having thus pared each case down to the single issue 
of whether living subject matter may be patented, he had little trouble 
concluding that it could be. The Bergy case, although filed after Chakra-
barty' s, was the first to reach the CCPA. The court therefore addressed 
the issue at greater length in Bergy than in Chakrabarty, concluding in 
Chakrabarty that the two cases raised exactly the same issue and 
therefore the former decision controlled. 
Judge Rich observed in Bergy that, although the PTO had only 
addressed the single issue of whether living organisms are eligible for 
patent protection, Bergy had also argued on appeal "the product of 
nature question sidetracked by the Board."6° Characterizing as "incon-
trovertible" Bergy's evidence that the biologically pure culture does not 
occur in nature, Judge Rich surmised that "the board went in search of 
another reason to support the rejection because it realized the examin-
er's position was untenable," and concluded: "The biologically pure 
culture of claim 5 clearly does not exist in, is not found in, and is not a 
product of 'nature.' "61 
Turning to the PTO's argument that living organisms are unpatent-
able, he began with the "clarifying observation" that "we are not 
deciding whether living things in general, or, at most, whether any living 
things other than microorganisms, are within § 101. These questions 
must be decided on a case-by-case basis .... " He then considered a series 
of decisions cited by the PTO in which the claims at issue had been 
drawn to processes of using microorganisms, and the courts had suggest-
58 In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1032 ("No references have been cited against claim 5 
because the novelty and unobviousness of the biologically pure culture claimed are not 
questioned. Neither has utility been questioned."); In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 42 ("The 
PTO ... has not questioned that appellant has invented and adequately disclosed strains of 
bacteria ... which are new, useful, and unobvious."). 
59 In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1033; In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 42. 
60 563 F.2d at 1035. 
61 Id. 
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ed in dicta that the microorganisms themselves would not have been 
patentable.62 Turning the PTO's analysis of these cases on its head, 
Judge Rich observed that "processes, one of the categories of patentable 
subject matter specified in§ 101, are uniformly and consistently consid-
ered to be statutory subject matter notwithstanding the employment 
therein of living organisms and their life processes."63 It would be 
"illogical," he concluded, to insist that "the existence of life in a 
manufacture or composition of matter" renders such products unpatent-
able, while ''the functioning of a living organism and the utilization of its 
life functions in processes does not affect their status under § 101."64 To 
Judge Rich, Bergy's culture was "an industrial product used in an 
industrial process-a useful or technological art if there ever was one."65 
Characterizing the organisms and their uses as "much more akin to 
inanimate chemical compositions such as reactants, reagents, and cata-
lysts than they are to horses and honeybees or raspberries and roses," he 
concluded that the PTO's fears that their patenting would make "all 
new, useful, and unobvious species of plants, animals, and insects 
created by man patentable" was "far-fetched. " 66 Having thus resolved 
that microorganisms are not categorically excluded from patent eligibili-
ty, he concluded that the rejection in Chakrabarty must also be reversed 
when that case came before him five months later.67 
By this point the advent of commercial biotechnology had raised the 
stakes of the controversy over patentability of microorganisms. The day 
after the CCPA's decision in Chakrabarty, a front-page story in The 
Washington Post reported that the decision "represents a potential gold 
mine for corporations involved in genetic engineering research. "68 
Among scientists, anxiety about the hazards of genetic engineering had 
begun to subside, leading the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to 
relax previously imposed safety restrictions on use of the technology by 
its grantees.69 But controversy continued among the general public, with 
62 Id. at 1035-37. 
63 Id. at 1037. 
64Id. 
65 Id. at 1038. 
66 Id. at 1038-39. The two dissenters characterized Judge Rich's distinction between 
microorganisms and other living things as "purely gratuitous and clearly erroneous," 
noting that the majority had failed to "advance any rationale for distinguishing between 
different types of living things .... " 
67 In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 43 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
68 Austin Scott, Court Rules GE Can Patent Life Created in Lab, WASH. PosT, Mar. 3, 
1978, at Al. See also, Oil-Eating Bacterium Can Be Patented by G.E., Court Rules in 3-2 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1978, at A26. 
69 43 F.R. 60080 (Dec. 22, 1978). 
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some local governments considering their own restrictions on biotechnol-
ogy research as federally-imposed restrictions were relaxed. 70 
While the government pondered its options, the PTO was aware of 
the precarious force of Judge Rich's decisions in the face of continuing 
public controversy.71 At the time, intermediate appellate jurisdiction over 
patent matters was divided between the CCPA, which heard appeals 
from decisions of the PTO, and the regional circuit courts of appeal, 
which heard appeals from decisions of the federal district courts in 
patent infringement cases. These other courts might not share Judge 
Rich's picture of industrial biotechnology as merely an efficient way to 
do chemistry, and might declare patents on life forms invalid when they 
came before them for enforcement. The PTO ultimately urged the 
Solicitor General to appeal the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court, figuring 
that the issue would eventually be resolved by Congress.72 
Remand and Reconsideration 
While the government's petitions for review in Bergy and Chakra-
barty were pending, the Supreme Court reversed the CCP A in another 
case involving patent eligibility, Parker v. Flook. 73 The invention in that 
case was a computer-implemented method for updating alarm limits 
during catalytic conversion processes through use of a novel mathemati-
cal formula. Justice Stevens's opinion for the majority took a strikingly 
different approach to the issue of patent eligibility than that expressed 
by Judge Rich. He began by noting that the Court's decision six years 
earlier in Gottschalk v. Benson74 was inconsistent with a literal interpre-
tation of § 101 of the Patent Act, notwithstanding the apparently 
unqualified language of the statute: 
The plain language of 101 does not answer the question. It is true, 
as respondent argues, that his method is a "process" in the ordinary 
sense of the work. But that was also true of the algorithm ... that 
was involved in Gottschalk v. Benson. The holding that the discovery 
of that method could not be patented as a "process" forecloses a 
purely literal reading of 101.75 
70 See Donald S. Fredrickson, The Recombinant DNA Controversy: A Memoir: Science, 
Politics & the Public Interest 1974-1981 (2001), available at National Library of Medicine, 
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/FFNiews/Exhibit/documents/rdna. 
71 Kevles, supra note 26, at 122-123. 
72/d. 
73 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
74 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
75 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90. 
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Echoing Justice Douglas's analogy between mathematical algorithms and 
laws of nature in Gottschalk v. Benson, the majority concluded that the 
Court's earlier decision in Funk v. Kalo indicated the proper analysis: 
Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of 
the claimed invention, as one of the "basic tools of scientific and 
technological work," it is treated as though it were a familiar part of 
the prior art . . . . 76 
The Court rejected the argument that this approach confuses the deter-
mination of patent eligibility under § 101 with the determinations of 
novelty and "inventiveness" under §§ 102 and 103. In language reminis-
cent of Justice Douglas's opinion in Funk v. Kalo, Justice Stevens 
elaborated: 
The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented 
rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not processes, 
but rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are 
not the kind of "discoveries" that the statute was enacted to protect. 
The obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be 
patented must precede the determination of whether that discovery 
is, in fact, new or obvious .... Respondent's process is unpatentable 
under 101, not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one 
component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within 
the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no 
patentable invention.77 
Yet there were signs that the Supreme Court was softening in its 
approach to patent eligibility. The Court acknowledged that its reasoning 
was "derived from opinions written before the modern business of 
developing programs for computers was conceived,"78 and that its deci-
sion should not be interpreted "as reflecting a judgment that patent 
protection of certain novel and useful computer programs will not 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, or that such 
protection is undesirable as a matter of policy."79 Rather, the Court saw 
the issue before it as raising "difficult questions of policy" that could 
better be answered by Congress, and concluded that "we must proceed 
cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly 
unforeseen by Congress. " 80 
76 Id. at 591-92. 
77 Id. at 593-94. 
78 Id. at 595. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 596, citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972). 
Perhaps the most conspicuous harbinger of the Court's imminent liberalization of its 
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A few days later, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the 
CCPA in Bergy and remanded for reconsideration in light of Parker v. 
Flook. 81 The CCPA granted the PTO's petition to vacate its own decision 
in Chakrabarty and set the two cases for hearing together, asking the 
parties to file supplementary briefs on the effect, "if any," of Parker v. 
Flook on its prior decisions.82 
Judge Rich again wrote for the majority on reconsideration, again 
reversing the rejections in both cases. He was conspicuously unimpressed 
by the Flook decision and visibly irritated at the government for having 
taken the cases up to the Supreme Court. He began with a back-to-basics 
review of the anatomy of the patent statute, purportedly for the benefit 
of the Supreme Court, which he felt had exposed some confusion about 
the statute in its Flook opinion: 
The reason for our consideration of the statutory scheme ... is that 
. . . we find in Flook an unfortunate and apparently unconscious, 
though clear, commingling of distinct statutory provisions which are 
conceptually unrelated, namely, those pertaining to the categories of 
inventions in § 101 which may be patentable and to the conditions 
for patentability demanded by the statute for inventions within the 
statutory categories, particularly the nonobviousness condition of 
§ 103 .... The problem of accurate unambiguous expression is exac-
erbated by the fact that prior to the Patent Act of 1952 the words 
"invention," "inventive," and "invent" had distinct legal implica-
tions related to the concept of patentability which they have not had 
for the past quarter century. . . . Statements in the older cases must 
be handled with care lest the terms used in their reasoning clash 
with the reformed terminology of the present statute; lack of metic-
ulous care may lead to distorted legal conclusions. 83 
He offered an analogy to three doors that a patent applicant must open 
and pass through in order to get a patent, corresponding to§§ 101, 102, 
interpretation of § 101 was the fact that three justices dissented, taking the position that 
the majority was confusing the issue of subject-matter patentability under § 101 with the 
criteria of novelty and inventiveness under §§ 102 and 103. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 
598, 600 (Stewart, J. dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.). 
8! Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). 
s2 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 956-58 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
83 Id. at 959. The unmistakable condescension toward the Supreme Court in Judge 
Rich's opinion led amicus University of California to distance itself from the opinion of the 
CCPA in its Supreme Court brief, even as it asked the Supreme Court to affirm the 
decision, noting that the CCP A "tends toward legal error and has long waged war against 
this Court's venerable and unvaried interpretations of the patent laws." Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the University of California at 24 (filed Jan. 28, 1980) (Westlaw Supreme Court 
Briefs file). 
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and 103 of the Patent Act. To get through the first door, the invention 
need not satisfy any "qualitative conditions," so long as it fits within the 
"broad and general" categories of "any ... process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any ... improvement thereof." Judge 
Rich's ellipses omitted the statutory language "new and useful," which 
appears twice in§ 101. As he explained, "the invention is not examined 
under that statute for novelty because that is not the statutory scheme 
of things or the long-established administrative practice." Instead, the 
invention, whether new or old, passes through the first door, to be 
examined for novelty at the second door under the standards set forth in 
§ 102. To reject a claim for lack of novelty under § 101 rather than 
§ 102 "is confusing and therefore bad law."84 In contrast to his tone of 
gentle condescension toward the Supreme Court for confusing the issues 
of patent-eligibility and patent-worthiness in Parker v. Flook, Judge Rich 
excoriated the Solicitor General for having done the same thing in its 
briefs, "badly and with a seeming sense of purpose. "85 
Turning to the assigned task on remand of determining what light 
the Supreme Court's opinion in Parker v. Flook shed on the issue in 
Bergy and Chakrabarty, Judge Rich concluded that the only thing the 
three cases had in common is that they all involved § 101. He noted 
that: 
Flook was about the patentability of computer programs as "pro-
cesses," not about the patentability of living subject matter as 
"manufactures" or "compositions of matter." Nor did the Court's 
review of "hornbook law" concerning the nonpatentability of "prin-
ciples, laws of nature, mental processes, intellectual concepts, ideas, 
natural phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods of calculation, 
fundamental truths, original causes, motives, the Pythagorean theo-
rem, and ... computer-implementable method claims ... " have any 
application to the Bergy and Chakrabarty appeals, which "do not 
involve an attempt to patent any of these things. " 86 
On two final points, Judge Rich was not content to simply distin-
guish Flook from the cases before him, but felt the need to set the 
Supreme Court straight. First was the statement in Flook, relying on the 
authority of Funk v. Kala, that a mathematical formula, like a law of 
nature, must be deemed to be "a familiar part of the prior art"-"even 
when it was not familiar, was not prior, was discovered by the applicant 
84 Bergy at 961. 
85 Id. Judge Rich characterized as "subversive nonsense" the Solicitor General's 
argument that the opening phrase, "Whoever invents or discovers ... " continues in effect 
the prior judicial standard of "invention" as a requirement of§ 101. Id. at 963. 
86 Id. at 965. 
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for patent, was novel at the time he discovered it, and was useful. "87 
Although insisting that "the foregoing novel principle has no applicabili-
ty whatever" to the appeals before him, Judge Rich also warned that the 
Supreme Court's approach "gives to the term 'prior art,' which is a very 
important term of art in patent law, ... an entirely new dimension with 
consequences of unforeseeable magnitude. "88 Second was Justice Ste-
vens's concluding observation, relying on the authority of Deepsouth 
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,89 that the courts should proceed cautiously 
when "asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by 
Congress."90 Peering behind the Flook opinion to the Deepsouth case, 
Judge Rich thought that what had made it appropriate for the Court in 
Deepsouth to await further guidance from Congress was that it was 
asked to overturn a long line of prior decisions. By contrast, Judge Rich 
observed that the Bergy and Chakrabarty cases raised an issue of first 
impression, which the courts could resolve on their own without await-
ing any signal from Congress. 91 He returned to this theme at the end of 
the opinion, turning the charge of unauthorized lawmaking back on the 
PTO: 
Faced with the necessity of rendering a decision one way or the 
other on whether these inventions are encompassed by § 101, there 
being no prior decisions to guide us, we merely carry out our normal 
judicial function in deciding to say yes rather than no .... Rather, it 
seems to us, it is the PTO, not this court, that is attempting to 
legislate. It may have reasons for not wanting to examine the 
appealed claims for patentability under §§ 102 and 103, but if so, it 
has not revealed them ... For whatever reason, it decided to reject, 
first on one ground and then on another, and then set out, lawyer-
like, to devise unduly exaggerated justifications spiced with bits and 
pieces from wholly unrelated plant patent legislation from nearly 
half a century ago .... "We should not read into the patent laws 
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not ex-
pressed. "92 
87 Id. at 965-66 ("This gives to the term 'prior art,' which is a very important term of 
art in patent law, particularly in the application of§ 103, an entirely new dimension with 
consequences of unforeseeable magnitude. . . . The potential for great harm to the incen-
tives of the patent system is apparent.' "). 
88 Id. 
89 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
90 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978). 
91 596 F.2d at 966-67. 
92 Id. at 987-88 (quoting from U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 
(1933)). 
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Judge Rich's opm10n on remand offered substantially the same 
analysis as his original opinions for the CCPA in Bergy and Chakrabarty. 
But the decision on remand picked up an additional vote from Judge 
Baldwin, who had dissented the first time around in both cases. 93 He 
wrote a separate concurring opinion disagreeing with Judge Rich's 
conclusion that Parker v. Flook had no bearing on these appeals, and 
then offered a painstaking analysis of Supreme Court precedents that 
had excluded certain categories of subject matter from patent protection 
notwithstanding that they fell within "the dictionary definitions of 
process, manufacture or composition of matter:" 
The common thread throughout these cases is that claims which 
directly or indirectly preempt natural laws or phenomena are pro-
scribed, whereas claims which merely utilize natural phenomena via 
explicitly recited manufactures, compositions of matter or processes 
to accomplish new and useful end results define statutory inven-
tions.94 
Because he concluded that the claims before the court "do not reach out 
to encompass natural phenomena ... but rather recite only non-natural-
ly occurring compositions of matter that are but single tools for utilizing 
natural phenomena in producing new and useful end results," he voted 
with the majority to reverse the rejections.95 The sole remaining dissen-
ter was Judge Miller, who chastised the majority for concentrating on 
"literal statements" in Parker v. Flook while ignoring the thrust of the 
Court's admonition to await a clear signal from Congress when there is a 
basis for substantial doubt as to its intent.96 
Back to the Supreme Court 
By this point the scientific and commercial significance of the 
controversy over patenting life was manifest. As concerns about the 
hazards of gene-splicing were subsiding among scientists,97 researchers 
had successfully used recombinant DNA technology to clone medically 
93 596 F.2d 952, 988 (Baldwin, J. concurring). 
94Id. 
95 Id. at 997. Judge Baldwin also dismissed the argument that the decision would 
inevitably lead to the patenting of higher life forms with the prediction that inventors 
would find it too difficult to comply with the disclosure requirements of§ 112 of the Patent 
Act for higher organisms. Id. at n.7. 
96 596 F.2d 952, 999 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
97 After initially imposing stringent guidelines on the use of government funds in 
recombinant DNA research, 41 Fed. Reg. 27902 (Jul. 7, 1976), the National Institutes of 
Health relaxed the restrictions considerably 2 ¾ years later after preliminary experience 
produced no evidence of illness or other harm. 43 Fed. Reg. 60080 (Dec. 22, 1978). 
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important genes in microorganisms.98 New companies were forming to 
develop promising therapies out of these discoveries, raising capital from 
investors who hoped to earn a return on their investments.99 Both 
private firms and universities engaged in biotechnology research looked 
to patents as a means of capturing the value of the new technology, and 
took note of the Chakrabarty and Bergy cases. 
While the cases were before the CCP A on remand from the Supreme 
Court, the University of California, the American Patent Law Associa-
tion, and Genentech filed amicus briefs on behalf of the patent appli-
cants.100 By the time the cases reached the Supreme Court again, these 
amici were joined by the New York Patent Law Association, the Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers Association, the American Society for Microbiolo-
gy, the American Society of Biological Chemists, the Association of 
American Medical Colleges, the American Council on Education, and the 
California Institute of Technology, as well as several eminent scientists, 
all arguing in favor of patent protection. Indeed, according to historian 
Daniel Kevles, by this point many people within the PTO favored patent 
protection for living organisms, including the new Commissioner, Donald 
Banner, who thought the CCPA decision was correct and was not 
inclined to seek Supreme Court review.101 Others within the PTO favored 
taking the case to the Supreme Court in the hope of getting an affir-
mance that would give biotechnology investors greater assurance of the 
validity of their patents, while the Solicitor General of the United States 
favored reversal. 102 The government filed for certiorari in both cases, but 
after the petition was granted, the patent applicant in Bergy voluntarily 
canceled its claims to the purified microorganism, leading the Supreme 
Court to remand with instructions to dismiss Bergy as moot.10:i As a 
consequence (indeed, perhaps by design),104 the Supreme Court was left 
98 See, e.g., K. Itakura et al., Expression in Escherichia coli of a chemically synthesized 
gene for the hormone somatostatin; 198 ScIENCE 1056-63 (1977); D. Goeddel et al., 
Expression in Escherichia coli of chemically synthesized genes for human insulin, 76 PRoc 
NATL AcAD. Sci 106-110 (1979); D. Goeddel et al., Direct expression in Escherichia coli of a 
DNA sequence coding for human growth hormone, 281 NATURE 544-48 (1979). 
99 See, e.g., R. Reinhold, There's Gold in Them Thar Recombinant Genetic Bits, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 1980, sec. 4, p.8, col. 3; Where genetic engineering will change industry, Bus. 
WK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 160. 
100 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 957. 
101 Kevles, supra note 26, at 126. 
102 Id. at 123, 126-27. 
103 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (vacating judgment in In re Bergy 
and remanding with directions to dismiss as moot). 
104 According to Professor Kevles, Bergy's lawyer believed that Chakrabarty had a 
stronger case, and thought it more likely that the Supreme Court would uphold the 
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to consider the patentability of life forms only in the more compelling 
context of the human-modified organism claimed in Chakrabarty. 
If the PTO Commissioner was an ambivalent petitioner before the 
Supreme Court, the Petitioner's Brief did not betray it. 105 Characterizing 
the question presented as whether a living organism is patentable 
subject matter, the brief cited venerable Supreme Court precedent 
requiring that "the patent laws . . . be strictly construed in light of the 
basic national economic policy against monopoly, and in order to pre-
serve to Congress decisions concerning extension of the patent laws into 
new areas."106 According to the petitioner, "it was generally assumed by 
the legal profession, writers on the subject, and Congress" that living 
organisms are not patentable, and Congress had acted on that assump-
tion in passing the Plant Patent Act in1930 and the Plant Variety 
Protection Act in 1970.107 Congress, but not the courts, could adapt the 
terms of protection to suit the attributes of living subject matter, as it 
had done in those prior acts, and could decide what weight to attach to 
perceptions of ethical problems and public health risks associated with 
genetic engineering. 108 The brief made no mention of Funk v. Kala or the 
products of nature doctrine. 
Chakrabarty disputed that allowance of his claim would extend the 
patent laws into new areas,109 counting over sixty issued U.S. patents 
claiming living subject matter and identifying official PTO classes and 
subclasses to deal with such patentsY0 Highlighting a passage from the 
legislative history of the Patent Act, Chakrabarty urged that a patenta-
ble manufacture "may include anything under the sun that is made by 
man,"111 and went on to distinguish his engineered organism from the 
relatively unchanged living materials that had been denied patent pro-
tection in past judicial decisions. He concluded that "[i]f the Government 
patentability of living subject matter if the only case before it were Chakrabarty than if it 
were deciding both cases together. Kevles, supra note 26, at 127. 
105 See Brief for Petitioner on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals, Diamond v. Chakrabarty (filed Jan. 4, 1980) (available from Lexis-
Nexis). 
106 Id., text preceding note 9. 
101 Id., text at note 9. 
108 Id., text at notes 14-23. 
109 See Brief for Respondent On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond v. Chakrabarty (filed Jan. 29, 1980) (available from 
Lexis-Nexis). 
110 Id. text at notes 9-10. 
111 Id. at note 22 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), p.6; S. Rep. 
No. 1979 (1952), U.S. Code, Cong. and Admin. News, p. 2399). 
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wishes to reverse its policy, it should address its desires to the Congress, 
which can legislate an exclusion, if that is found to be required by the 
public interest." 
Chakrabarty's numerous amici, including elite scientists, universi-
ties, and scientific societies, explained to the Court the sophisticated 
human intervention involved in the new biotechnology and argued that a 
per se rule excluding living things from patentability would discourage 
the commercial development of important scientific advances.112 Some of 
the briefs urged that a distinction between living and nonliving subject 
matter was not only unprecedented as a matter of patent law, but 
unworkable and meaningless from a scientific perspective.113 
Only one amicus curiae filed a brief in support of the government 
opposing patent protection for living subject matter on the merits-the 
Peoples Business Commission, a non-profit educational foundation 
formed by genetic engineering critic Jeremy Rifkin. That brief paradoxi-
cally echoed the arguments in favor of patent protection for living 
organisms, noting that such patents ''would significantly contribute to 
the profit potential of the genetic industry, thus generating a greater 
momentum in research and development of genetic engineering technol-
ogies" leading to a "rapid proliferation of genetic techniques ... in many 
other aspects of the nation's economic life. "rn Reading these arguments 
today, it takes some imagination to reconstruct the prevailing anxiety 
about genetic engineering that would lead the authors to expect these 
incentive effects to be counted as a reason to exclude living subject 
matter from patent protection. 
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the CCPA by a 5-4 vote, 
revealing a significant shift in the balance of views on the Court since 
the 6-3 decision just two years earlier in Parker v. Flook. The Chakra-
barty majority included Justice Stevens, who had authored the majority 
ll2 The arguments advanced in the briefs are summarized in Kevles, supra note 26 at 
127-31. 
113 See, e.g., Brief on Behalf of Dr. Leroy E. Hood, Dr. Thomas P. Maniatis, Dr. David 
S. Eisenberg, The American Society Of Biological Chemists, The Association Of American 
Medical Colleges, The California Institute of Technology, The American Council On 
Education As Amici Curiae at 12 (filed Jan. 26, 1980) (Westlaw Supreme Court Briefs file) 
("There is no distinct line between life and non-life. The prevailing view among scientists 
is that the essential characteristic of 'living' subject matter is nothing more than its 
complexity."); Brief of Dr. George Pieczenik as Amicus Curiae at 3 (filed Jan. 29, 1980) 
(Westlaw Supreme Court Briefs file) ("The distinction between living and non-living 
matter has no real meaning in relation to this technology. . . . To attempt to separate 
patentable and unpatentable subject matter on the basis of such a concept is to invite 
confusion in the art, to ignore existing law and to ignore scientific reality."). 
114 Brief on Behalf of the People's Business Commission, Amicus Curiae at 3 (filed Dec. 
13, 1979) (Westlaw Supreme Court Briefs file). 
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opinion denying patent protection in Flook, and Justice Blackmun, who 
had joined in that opinion, as well as the three Flook dissenters, Justices 
Stewart and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger. Justice Stevens's 
opinion for the Flook majority and Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the 
Chakrabarty majority took strikingly different approaches to the proper 
construction of section 101 of the Patent Act. Whereas the Flook 
majority had insisted that the "plain language" of section 101 did not 
answer the question of what kind of "discoveries" the statute was 
enacted to protect, 115 the Chakrabarty majority rested heavily on the 
plain language of the statute, proclaiming that "courts 'should not read 
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has 
not expressed.' " 116 The Flook majority had warned that "we must 
proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas 
wholly unforeseen by Congress."117 Two years later, the Chakrabarty 
majority balked at applying this principle to preclude patenting of living 
subject matter, quipping that "[a] rule that unanticipated inventions are 
without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent law 
that anticipation undermines patentability" and insisting that "Con-
gress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely be-
cause such inventions are often unforeseeable."118 Both opinions ac-
knowledged that it was up to Congress, and not the courts, to set the 
boundaries of patent eligibility. But the Flook majority thought the PTO 
and the courts should await further clarification from Congress before 
allowing patent protection for computer-implemented inventions of the 
sort at issue in that case, while the Chakrabarty majority, believing that 
Congress had already broadly authorized patent protection for "anything 
under the sun that is made by man," thought that until Congress saw fit 
to amend the statute, "this Court must construe the language of§ 101 
as it is. " 119 
115 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 588, 593. 
116 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. 
117 437 U.S. at 596. 
118 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315-16. 
119 Jd. at 318. One could reconcile the two decisions as a formal matter on the ground 
that in Chakrabarty the government was proposing a new limitation on patent eligibility 
(an exclusion for living subject matter) that had never previously been articulated in the 
case law, while in Flook it was relying upon a longstanding limitation (an exclusion for 
mathematical algorithms) that was well established in prior cases. If one imagines that 
Congress scrutinizes judicial opinions and enacts new legislation when it is unhappy with 
the directions of the case law, perhaps it makes sense for the Court to await guidance from 
Congress before creating a new judicial limitation (as it did in Chakrabarty), while 
retaining in effect time-honored judicial limitations that Congress has had plenty of time to 
correct (such as the limitation at issue in Flook). Indeed, perhaps this explains why Justice 
Stevens was willing to join the expansive majority opinion in Chakrabarty, although he had 
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The phrase "anything under the sun that is made by man" has been 
much quoted in subsequent judicial decisions as supporting an expansive 
interpretation of the scope of § 101.120 But the expansive words "any-
thing under the sun" are qualified by the restrictive condition "that is 
made by man." For the Chakrabarty majority, this restrictive condition 
captured the difference between Chakrabarty's microorganism and the 
kinds of discoveries that had previously been excluded from patent 
protection as "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas. " 121 The Court saw the same distinction lurking in the legislative 
history of the Plant Patent Act: 
Congress . . . recognized that the relevant distinction was not be-
tween living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, 
whether living or not, and human-made inventions.122 
Although the government never argued that Chakrabarty's organism 
was a product of nature, Justice Burger nonetheless explained at some 
length why it was not, suggesting that the government's concession on 
this point made the outcome of the case a foregone conclusion. The very 
first sentence of the opinion characterized the issue before the court as 
"whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."123 Later, the majority emphatically 
distinguished Chakrabarty's microorganism from the unpatentable dis-
covery in Funk v. Kalo: 
There, the patentee had discovered that there existed in nature 
certain species of root-nodule bacteria which did not exert a mutual-
ly inhibitive effect on each other. He used that discovery to produce 
a mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous 
plants. . . . Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new 
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His 
discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is 
patentable subject matter under § 101. 124 
opposed patent protection for computer-implemented inventions just two years earlier 
when he authored the majority in Parker v. Flook and did so again one year later when he 
authored the dissent in Diamond v. Diehr. 
120 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 
534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001); State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
121 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 44 7 U.S. at 309. 
122 Id. at 313. 
123 Id. at 305 (emphasis added). 
124 Id. at 310. 
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In other words, once it was conceded that the microorganism was not a 
product of nature, the invention had passed the test of§ 101. 
Beyond Chakrabarty 
Although the Supreme Court recognized in Chakrabarty, as it had in 
prior decisions, that Congress has the authority to set the rules for 
determining what may be patented, Chakrabarty nonetheless seemed to 
represent a shift in the default rules that apply in the face of Congres-
sional inaction. 125 Whereas Flook, by denying protection, had placed the 
burden of inertia on those who seek protection for new fields of technolo-
gy to approach Congress, Chakrabarty, by granting protection, placed the 
burden of inertia on those who opposed it. This shift has had a number 
of important consequences. 
First, it immediately stemmed the flow of cases involving the scope 
of § 101 into the courts. The decision in Chakrabarty signaled to the 
PTO that the Supreme Court was unlikely to back them up in future 
disputes with the CCPA (and, later, the Federal Circuit) over interpreta-
tion of the scope of patent eligible subject matter. The PTO promptly 
became less skeptical about the patent eligibility of new categories 
subject matter, holding, for example, that plants126 and animals127 were 
eligible for protection under§ 101 and thereby avoiding the occasion for 
judicial review of the soundness of its § 101 rejections. When the PTO 
rejects patent claims, applicants may appeal their decisions immediately, 
but when the PTO allows claims, the courts have no occasion to consider 
the correctness of the allowances until an infringement defendant chal-
lenges the validity of an issued patent. A defendant may avoid infringe-
ment liability by proving that a patent is invalid by clear and convincing 
evidence, 128 and occasionally defendants have argued that an issued 
patent is invalid under § 101.129 But because infringement defendants 
are typically commercial competitors of the plaintiffs who hold patents of 
125 The Supreme Court had once before authorized protection, over a vigorous dissent, 
for subject matter that Congress had thus far declined to protect in the case of Internation-
al News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), affirming a lower court remedy 
for common law "misappropriation" of news stories that the parties conceded could not be 
protected under federal copyright law. 
126 In re Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (ENA) 443 (Ed. Pat. App. & Int.1985) (reversing 
examiner's rejection for lack of eligible subject matter of patent claims to seeds and plants 
in reliance on Diamond v. Chakrabarty). 
127 Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (ENA) 1425 (Ed. Pat. App. & Int. 1987) (reversing 
examiner's rejection for lack of eligible subject matter of patent claims to oysters). 
128 See Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int'!, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
129 E.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 
534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001). 
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their own on similar subject matter, they are more likely to challenge the 
patents on grounds that are specific to the particular patents in suit 
(such as anticipation or obviousness in light of the prior art) rather than 
on broader grounds (such as lack of patentable subject matter) that 
might categorically invalidate the patents that they own along with the 
patents that they are charged with infringing. Even when infringement 
defendants are willing to challenge the patent eligibility of an invention, 
the issue is unlikely to come before the courts in this context until years 
after the patent was first issued. Meanwhile, as the PTO continues to 
issue patents in a field, the expectation interest of firms in the continu-
ing availability of patents for their inventions grows, making it harder 
for courts to upset those interests by announcing a categorical exclusion 
from patent eligibility. 
Second, although the Court purported to address only a narrow 
issue of statutory interpretation concerning whether Chakrabarty's mi-
croorganism was eligible for patent protection, it ultimately embraced a 
very broad rule of patentability for "everything under the sun that is 
made by man," leaving little room to distinguish Chakrabarty in subse-
quent cases. For this reason, Chakrabarty has become a standard cita-
tion for the patentability of subject matter ranging from computer-
implemented algorithms130 and business methods131 to plants.132 Those 
who believe the patent system should exclude any categories of human 
innovation from its reach have little hope of prevailing in the courts, 
even if they get sued for patent infringement, 133 but must make their 
case before Congress. The result has been a stunning expansion in the 
kinds of innovations that are brought before the PTO, including new 
sports moves, games, cooking recipes, and even the technology of legal 
practice. 134 
Third, the burden of persuading Congress to change the patent laws 
has proven to be a heavy one, especially in industries where patent 
holders have a strong interest in maintaining the status quo and are 
thus well motivated to outmaneuver and outspend their anti-patent 
adversaries. For example, although religious groups and others opposed 
130 AT & T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 946 (1999). 
131 State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
l:l2 J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001). 
133 Those who wish to challenge the issuance of patents that they are not infringing 
face the additional burden of persuading the courts that they have standing to litigate the 
issue. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(dismissing challenge to issuance of patents on animals for lack of standing). 
134 Recent examples may be found in ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY. PATENT LAw & 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS at 206-08 (3d ed. 2002). 
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to the patenting of animals as a matter of principle were able to get some 
members of Congress to hold hearings on the topic,135 they ultimately 
failed to get any legislation passed. Opposition to patents on DNA 
sequences has followed a similar course in the legislative arena.136 
In 1980, the Supreme Court assumed that Congress was "free to 
amend§ 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced 
by genetic engineering" or "to craft a statute specifically designed for 
such living things."137 Even at the time, such legislative action may have 
been improbable. 138 Twenty-five years later, the only special rules that 
Congress has enacted for biotechnology patents have been provisions 
that the biotechnology industry has favored. 139 
Conclusion 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty was 
a watershed moment not just for the biotechnology industry, but also for 
135 E.g., Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
136 E.g., Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts and Intel!. Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 1061h Cong. (2000). 
On the other hand, the American Medical Association effectively lobbied Congress for 
relief from remedies for infringement of patents on medical and surgical methods. P.L. No. 
104-208, Div. A, Title I, § l0l(a), codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). For an account of the 
legislative process by which this provision was enacted, see Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. 
Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legislation, 71 ST JoHN's L. REV. 329, 331-38 
(1997). 
More recently, following the decision of the Federal Circuit to allow patents on 
business methods in State St. Bank, Congress passed legislation protecting prior users of 
subsequently patented business methods from infringement liability. P.L. No. 106-113, 
Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273. 
Neither of these legislative initiatives altered the range of subject matter eligible for 
patent protection under § 101. 
137 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318. 
138 Today, it might well place the U.S. in violation of its treaty obligations. The GATT-
TRIPS agreement, to which the U.S. acceded in 1995, prohibits members from discriminat-
ing in the provision of patent protection on the basis of field of technology. In fact, 
although the U.S. patent system generally applies a unitary set of rules to inventions in all 
fields, the Patent Act has some field-specific provisions, some of which Congress has 
enacted since the TRIPS agreement took effect. 
139 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (permitting the patenting of a biotechnological process 
using or resulting in a composition of matter that is novel and nonobvious, notwithstand-
ing that the process might not otherwise be deemed nonobvious). See also, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 27l(g) (defining as patent infringement the importation into the U.S. of a product made 
abroad by a U.S.-patented process, a change in the law favored by the biotechnology 
industry). 
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the ongoing struggle between champions of an expansive patent system 
on the CCPA and the skeptics on the Supreme Court. As predicted by 
both proponents and opponents of patents on living organisms, invest-
ment in biotechnology R & D has flourished in the wake of Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty. But the full consequences of the expansive approach to 
patent eligibility endorsed by the Chakrabarty majority continue to be 
felt far beyond the biotechnology industry. Five years after the departure 
from the Supreme Court of Justice Douglas, the Chakrabarty decision 
marked the beginning of the end of the Court's skeptical period. Thereaf-
ter, it would be up to the CCPA and the Federal Circuit, absent explicit 
restrictions from Congress, to decide just how expansive the subject 
matter boundaries of the patent system are. By the time of Judge Rich's 
death nearly twenty years later, the Federal Circuit had not only 
refrained from adopting new judge-made limitations on patent eligibility, 
but had retreated from limitations announced in prior caselaw. 140 The 
Supreme Court has not seen fit to reverse, and Congress has not seen fit 
to intervene. A quarter century ago it was unclear whether the subject 
matter boundaries of the patent system were expansive enough to 
embrace biotechnology and information technology. Today, it is not clear 
whether the patent system has any subject matter boundaries at all. 
140 E.g., In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (overturning "printed matter" 
rejection); State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (reversing holding of invalidity based on exclu-
sions for mathematical algorithms and business methods); AT & T v. Excel Communica-
tions, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999) (reversing holding of 
invalidity based on exclusions of mathematical algorithms and intangible processes). 
